Religious School Employees Have Limited Right to Bring Discrimination Claims

The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that religious school employees are broadly covered under the “ministerial exception” grounded in the First Amendment. Our Lady of Guadalupe School v Morrissey-Berru.

At issue was whether the First Amendment permits courts to intervene in employment disputes involving teachers at religious schools who are entrusted with the responsibility of instructing their students in the faith.  Relying on prior cases, the Court noted the First Amendment protects the right of religious institutions “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”  In previously applying this principle, the Court held in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, (2012), that the First Amendment barred a court from entertaining an ADA employment discrimination claim brought by an elementary school teacher against the religious school where she taught. In doing so, the Court did not announce “a rigid formula” for determining whether an employee falls within the “ministerial exception,” but identified criteria that leaned toward inclusion, such as an employee’s title, educational training, responsibility to teach religion, and participation in students’ religious activities.

In the instant cases, one teacher filed an ADA claim after being terminated following a request for a leave due to cancer, while the other filed an ADEA claim after being terminated and replaced by a younger teacher. The employer claimed both were fired due to performance.

In reviewing the job duties of both teachers, the Court found each taught all elementary school subjects and religion, attended faculty prayer services, modeled and promoted Catholic faith and morals, participated in liturgical activities, prepared students for participation in the Mass, communion and confession, and prayed with students. While the two teachers were not given the title of “minister” and had less religious training than the teacher in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court found their jobs fell within the ministerial exception. The Court explained that religious education and the formation of students is the very reason for the existence of most private religious schools. Therefore, the selection and supervision of those teachers lie at the core of their mission. Judicial review of the way in which religious schools discharge those responsibilities would undermine the independence of religious institutions in a way that the First Amendment does not tolerate.

The Court went on to explain that the teachers in the instant case fell firmly within the ministerial exception because abundant record evidence showed they both performed vital religious duties.  Educating and forming students in the Catholic faith lay at the core of the mission of the schools where they taught, and their employment agreements and faculty handbooks specified in no uncertain terms that they were expected to help the schools carry out this mission, and that their work would be evaluated to ensure that they were fulfilling that responsibility.  As elementary school teachers responsible for providing instruction in all subjects, including religion, they were the members of the school staff who were entrusted most directly with the responsibility of educating their students in the faith. And not only were they obligated to provide instruction about the Catholic faith, but they were also expected to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in accordance with the faith. They prayed with their students, attended Mass with the students, and prepared the children for their participation in other religious activities. While their positions did perfectly mirror the one held by the teacher in Hosannah-Tabor, their core responsibilities as teachers of religion were essentially the same.  It went on to note that the failure to include “minister” in the employee’s title did not automatically take them outside the exception, nor did their lack of formal religious training, or close adherence to textbooks when teaching. More importantly, their employers thought they had a sufficient understanding of Catholicism to teach their students, and were appropriately involved in their students’ spiritual lives.

As the Court concluded, when a school with a religious mission entrusts a teacher with the responsibility of educating and forming students in the faith, judicial intervention into disputes between the school and the teacher threatens the school’s independence in a way that the First Amendment does not allow.

The ruling in this case does not change other aspects of the ADA and Title VII that allow religious employers to employ members of a particular faith, to the exclusion of others, even in non-ministerial roles, but prohibit them from taking discriminatory action against non-ministerial employees for reasons other than religion.

One area left somewhat unsettled is whether a religious organization can discriminate against non-ministerial employees on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-81p expressly permits such discrimination, however, the recent Supreme Court case of Bostick v. Clayton County held that Title VII prohibits sexual orientation and gender identify discrimination as a form of sex discrimination. A recent U.S. District Court case in Indiana, citing Bostick, held that Title VII’s exemption allowing religious organizations to prefer employees of a particular religion does not apply to sexual orientation claims, as such claims are sex based, not religion based. Starkey v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis. It will be interesting to see if other federal courts take the same position, or find that views on sexual orientation and gender identity are encompassed within the realm of religion, and thus can be used by a religious employer to terminate a non-ministerial, LBGTQ employee under Title VII’s religious exemption.